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Resumo 
Do modo como o defino, teísmo metodológico é a posição 
segundo a qual, para os propósitos de fazer ciência (ou 
investigação empírica, mais genericamente), nós 
deveríamos tratar o mundo como se fosse projetado por 
Deus. Uma vez que o teísmo metodológico não afirma que 
Deus é uma hipótese científica, ele é compatível com o 
naturalismo metodológico, que diz que deveríamos invocar 
apenas entidades naturais como hipóteses científicas. Isso 
constitui uma grande diferença entre o teísmo 
metodológico e o assim chamado Movimento do Design 
Inteligente, que rejeita o naturalismo metodológico. Eu não 
apenas defendo que cientistas teístas deveriam adotar o 
teísmo metodológico, mas também que este é mais fiel à 
prática e sucesso atuais da ciência do que suas alternativas 
mais importantes. Chego a essa conclusão ao olhar mais de 
perto os critérios de escolha teórica na ciência. Por fim, 
discuto as importantes ramificações potenciais que essa 
visão pode ter sobre a prática científica e nossa visão do 
mundo físico. 
Palavras-chaves: naturalismo metodológico, Movimento 
de Design Inteligente, axiarquismo, religião e ciência.  
 
Abstract 
As I define it, methodological theism is the position that, 
for the purposes of doing science (or empirical inquiry 
more generally), we should treat the world as if it were 
designed by God. Since methodological theism does not 
claim that God is a scientific hypothesis, it is compatible 
with methodological naturalism, which says that one 
should only invoke natural entities in a scientific 
hypothesis. This constitutes a major difference between 
methodological theism and the so-called Intelligent Design 
Movement, which rejects methodological naturalism. I not 
only argue that theistic scientists should adopt 
methodological theism, but that it accounts better for the 
actual practice and success of science than its major 
alternatives. I do this by looking closely at the criteria of 
theory choice in science. I then discuss the important 
potential ramifications this view might have on scientific 
practice and our view of the physical world. 
Keywords: methodological naturalism, Intelligent Design 
Movement, axiarchism, religion and science. 
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I SOME BACKGROUND 
Before developing the position I call methodological theism, it will be helpful to 
consider a well-known position that it easily can be confused with, that of the so-called 
Intelligent Design (ID) movement, which has a significant following in the United 
States.ID advocates not only claim that there is scientific evidence for an intelligent 
designer of life on earth, but that the hypothesis of such a designer should be considered 
a scientific hypothesis
1
.Opponents of ID often argue that as a matter of methodology, 
scientific explanations should only refer to natural entities and processes, a position 
called methodological naturalism. Since a transcendent designer is by definition not a 
natural entity, methodological naturalism entails that reference to such a designer should 
not be part of science; however, reference to a designer that is part of our universe, such 
as an extraterrestrial intelligence, is allowed. One cost that goes along with this claim is 
that if the hypothesis of a transcendent designer is excluded as a matter of methodology, 
then one cannot claim that science purports to tell us the truth about the origin of the 
universe and life on earth, but only that science gives us the best naturalistic account. 
This, however, moves finding the truth about questions of origins partly outside the 
domain of science, to philosophy or theology. 
As an analogy, if before starting an investigation, a racist detective excludes all 
white people from being the murderer, we would not expect his methodology to reliably 
determine the actual murderer. Rather, at best his methodology would be designed to 
determine the most probable non-white murderer. Applying this analogy to the ID 
debate, opponents of ID need to be honest in their presentations of evolution insofar as 
they are speaking as scientists who subscribe to methodological naturalism, Instead of 
presenting evolution as the true (or most probable) account of the origin of life on earth, 
they need to present it as only the best naturalistic account. Of course, speaking as 
philosophers or theologians, they could claim that evolution is the best overall 
explanation of life on earth.  
 
                                                          
1 See “Questions about Intelligent Design,” at http://www.discovery.org/id/faqs/#questionsAboutIntelligentDesign. 
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On the other hand, the major problem I see with ID's claim that we should 
include the hypothesis of a transcendent or generic designer as part of science is that 
such a hypothesis is not what I have called scientifically tractable. A hypothesis is 
scientifically tractable if the explanation it gives of some set of phenomena can be filled 
in using other branches of science, at least in part. All hypotheses in the sciences are 
tractable in this way.  For example, consider the big bang theory. The postulated 
"fireball" that resulted in our current universe provides a detailed explanation of such 
things as the microwave background radiation and the abundance of elements because 
we can use current particle physics to elaborate this fireball's internal dynamics. If its 
internal workings were forever beyond the realm of current science to investigate, it is 
doubtful such a hypothesis would be of much scientific interest. The same is true for the 
theory of evolution and other scientific theories. 
Insofar as the hypothesis of ID invokes a transcendent designer, it lacks this 
scientific tractability. One cannot use current science to elaborate the internal dynamics 
of a transcendent designer (though one might for a specific sort of non-transcendent 
designer, such as an extraterrestrial intelligence). Yet, lacking this characteristic is no 
small matter, since it is what allows scientific hypotheses to provide detailed 
explanations and predictions, and it gives scientists something to work with. It is not 
sufficient for advocates of ID to reply that intelligent design is the best explanation of 
various features of the natural world: many theists argue that God is the best 
explanation of the big bang and the laws of nature and many platonists argue that the 
existence of an immaterial realm of mathematical truths is the best explanation of the 
success of mathematics in science, but clearly this is insufficient to make the God or 
platonic hypotheses part of science. Even if advocates of ID are not convinced by the 
above line of reasoning, this significant and relevant difference between ID and regular 
scientific hypotheses should be acknowledged. 
Instead of treating the ID hypothesis as part of science, what I propose is that we 
treat the hypothesis of design, particularly design by God, as not itself a part of science, 
but a hypothesis that could potentially influence the practice of science. I call such a 
hypothesis a metascientific hypothesis. Such a hypothesis can influence science by 
affecting how we think the world is likely to be structured. Taking seriously the 
possibility of design opens science up to investigate, instead of simply dismissing, 
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various hypotheses about the nature of the physical world that postulate "designlike" 
patterns at a fundamental level. Hypotheses falling in this category include those 
advocating biocentric laws and higher-level patterns of teleology in evolution, such as 
explored by Teilhard de Chardin (1955), Rupert Sheldrake (1988), Simon Conway 
Morris (2003), and others. I thus applaud the kind of work being engaged in by some of 
supporters of ID at the Seattle based Biologic Institute in which they look for design-
like patterns in nature that seemingly cannot be explained by neo-Darwinian evolution. 
Although such patterns themselves are purely naturalistic, one would probably not look 
for and discover such patterns (given that they exist) if one rejected any sort of design 
hypothesis. In contrast, those who subscribe to a purely naturalistic view of the world 
favor hypotheses that minimize the appearance of design, or more broadly teleology. 
Treating the world as if it were designed has already been productive in physics. 
Since the scientific revolution, physics has implicitly assumed that underlying physical 
reality has a beautiful and elegant mathematical design. As Morris Kline, the famous 
historian of mathematics, observed: "From the time of the Pythagoreans, practically all 
asserted that nature was designed mathematically" (Kline, 1972: 153). Historically, 
starting with Galileo and Kepler, this has been what has grounded the search for an 
underlying elegant mathematical order in nature, though today such an order is largely 
taken for granted apart from any theistic basis. Indeed, as Banish Hoffman, one of 
Albert Einstein's main biographers, notes, "When judging a scientific theory, his own or 
another's, he asked himself whether he would have made the universe in this way had he 
been God" (HOFFMAN, 1973: 7-8). This shows that in doing science, Einstein treated 
the world as if it were created by God, even though he did not believe in the God of 
traditional theism. 
Treating the world as if it were created by God is what I call methodological 
theism. I propose that such a stance could be fruitful in other areas outside of physics, 
and that this is where the true significance for the practice of science of the question of 
whether the universe and life were in some way “intelligently designed”. I will explain 
this view in more depth in the rest of the paper and consider some potential implications 
for scientific practice. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL THEISM 
 
REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE FILOSOFIA DA RELIGIÃO / BRASÍLIA / V. 3 N.2 /P. 09-26 /DEZ. 2016 / ISSN 2352-8284 
13 
 
II METHODOLOGICAL THEISM EXPLICATED 
Since God is perfectly good, theism should lead us to expect that the universe is 
structured so as to positively, if not optimally, realize moral and aesthetic value. This 
means that a theist should expect the basic structure of the universe has a teleological 
order. As will be explained more below, these observations imply that when choosing 
between two hypothesis that account for the data, theists should choose the one that 
appears to result in the most moral and aesthetic value. Thus, under methodological 
theism, goodness – in both the moral and aesthetic sense – functions as a theoretical 
virtue: that is, as a means of deciding between two hypotheses both of which are 
logically consistent and account for the data. Theists also believe that God can intervene 
in the natural order, and so would be open to the existence of breaks in the natural order: 
e.g., they should be open to the possibility that the first cell simply came into existence 
around one or two billion years ago, without having come into existence via a process 
of chemical evolution. 
To see how goodness should function as a theoretical virtue for theists, suppose 
there are two theories, h1 and h2, of equal scope and which entail all the known data, but 
we know that h1 leads to a reality with a better overall balance of good over evil. In this 
case, a theist should think that it is more likely that h1 is true than h2, even if h2 is 
significantly simpler than h1.  At the very least, the theist should not judge h2 more 
probable than h1. For example, suppose that h2 is the hypothesis that the universe will 
undergo a quantum tunneling event and all life will be wiped out in the next ten years, 
and h1 is the hypothesis that the universe would continue on for a long time. Now 
suppose both theories are of equal scope and they entail all the known data, and that one 
believes such an end to life has such negative value that overall a reality in which h1 is 
true is better than h2. In this case, a theist should think that h1 is more probable than h2 
even if h2 is simpler than h1.Usually, however, goodness will not play such a direct role 
in choosing theories, but rather play an indirect role of supporting the use of simplicity 
(and sometimes elegance) in theory choice; this is because, as argued below, typically a 
universe with a simple (or elegant) underlying law structure allows for the realization 
within the universe of certain moral and aesthetic values. 
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It is helpful to see methodological theism in terms of an even larger 
methodological position, that of methodological axiarchism. Axiarchism is the thesis 
that reality is structured in such a way as to positively, if not optimally, realize value. 
Theism entails axiarchism, and given that the existence of God adds to the overall value 
of reality and God’s existence is logically possible, axiarchism entails theism. 
Methodological axiarchism is similar to methodological theism in that it considers 
moral and aesthetic values as theoretical virtues. I will mainly focus on this in the rest of 
the paper. 
It should be noted that both methodologic theism and methodological axiarchism 
are compatible with methodological naturalism. They are incompatible, however, with a 
position that could be called methodological atheism, which holds that when doing 
science, one should treat the universe as lacking any teleological structure, particularly 
with regard to human existence. Although few explicitly advocate methodological 
atheism, it is often conflated with methodological naturalism. This results in many 
scientists effectively advocating methodological atheism even though they purport only 
to be advocating methodological naturalism. So, it is important to distinguish between 
the two. Further, since typically only hypotheses that refer to natural entities are 
scientific tractable, my arguments above imply that theists also should be 
methodological naturalists. 
Next, I will show that methodological axiarchism is not an arbitrary imposition 
on science, but arises naturally out of scientific practice. 
III CRITERIA FOR THEORY CHOICE 
My argument begins by considering what has become known as the 
underdetermination of theory by data problem.  This is the problem that for any set of 
extant observational data, there are indefinitely many logically consistent hypotheses 
that can account for the data but which have different predictive consequences in 
untested domains. Consequently, in order for scientists to choose one theory over 
another – even merely for its potential predictive success in unobserved domains -- they 
must go beyond logical consistency and fit with data. Rather, they must rely on what are 
called theoretical virtues. The most commonly cited theoretical virtue is that of 
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simplicity, a virtue that says that everything else being equal, we should prefer simple 
theories over complex ones. Using this virtue commits one to some claim in the 
neighborhood of the idea that the relevant aspects of the world (such as the fundamental 
laws of nature) are more likely to be simple than complex.   
The need for invoking simplicity is nicely illustrated by the case of “curve 
fitting," in which scientists attempt to find the right equation that both accounts for a 
body of data and can serve as a trustworthy basis for future predictions or 
extrapolations. For example, suppose that one collects data on the relation between the 
magnitude of force exerted on a mass and the magnitude of the mass's acceleration. The 
data will consist of measurements of accelerations that result from various forces.  
Graphically, this could be represented by a plot of data points (with error bars), with the 
amount of force on the y-axis and the amount of acceleration on the x-axis. It is a 
mathematical fact that for any number of data points, there always exist infinitely many 
functions that will perfectly go through the data points, but radically disagree about the 
values of the force associated with unobserved values of acceleration. Consequently, to 
choose the appropriate function to use for predictions, scientists must consider 
something more than fit with data. Typically, scientists consider the simplicity, 
naturalness, elegance, or some other purported feature of an equation – such as how 
well it fits with background information (such as previous theories or similar cases). 
Indeed, the equation they ultimately choose might even miss one or more of the points 
by a greater amount than experimental error. [See Fig. 2] 
Fo
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Fig. 2. In extrapolating from the data points using the solid line 
instead of the other possible curves, scientists are implicitly 
assuming the world is in some sense more likely to be simple than 
complex.
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In the terminology I will now introduce, the use of a theoretical virtue implicitly 
commits one to claiming that some corresponding property is what I call an ideal of 
natural order (INO). Roughly, I define some overarching property to be an INO for a 
person if and only if:  
(i) Methodologically the person is explicitly or implicitly committed to treating 
the world as being, or likely to be, structured in such a way that there is a positive 
realization of that property; 
and, 
(ii) That commitment guides their inductive practices and choice of theories.   
For example, the use of simplicity in scientific theory choice implicitly commits 
one to something in the neighborhood of the claim that the universe is more likely to be 
simple than complex (at least in its basic law structure). Thus, insofar as scientists use 
simplicity this way, they are committed to simplicity as an INO. Finally, I define a 
primitive INO (a PINO) as an INO that is not based on a commitment to some other 
INO. Suppose, for instance, that one holds simplicity as an INO because one believes 
that the world is structured to optimize elegance and that elegance requires simplicity. 
In that case, one would not hold simplicity as a PINO. 
As shown by the curve-fitting example, INOs form the basis of our inductive 
practices – such as being able to extrapolate from observed data and to choose the best 
explanation of some set of phenomena. This means that one’s PINOs cannot be justified 
in a non-circular way by their past success, since any argument from their past success 
to their future reliability would be an argument from observed data (namely, their past 
success) to unobserved data (namely, their future success), and thus would itself require 
assuming one’s PINOs. Nonetheless, it seems possible for their past success to increase 
one’s confidence in them, and thus in some way confirm them; and likewise for their 
past failure to undermine them. 
In most cases of scientific inquiry, naturalists and axiarchists share the same 
INOs, with some qualifications to be discussed below. Where they differ is in their 
PINOs. Consider simplicity. Both axiarchists and naturalists would accept simplicity as 
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an INO for almost all cases of empirical inquiry. Naturalists would likely take some 
appropriately practical version of this INO as primitive – such as claiming that it is a 
brute fact that the universe is structured in a simple way, and it is a brute fact that 
simplicity should be an epistemic norm to decide between scientific theories. In 
contrast, axiarchists claim that reality is ordered for the positive realization of moral 
(and aesthetic) value – that is, the axiarchic thesis itself is their PINO; or put succinctly, 
axiarchists see goodness as a PINO. 
If the axiarchic thesis is to make sense of the use of simplicity and other 
theoretical virtues in scientific methodology, axiarchists must at least show that 
axiarchism renders the use of such virtues unsurprising in the vast majority 
circumstances. To begin, an axiarchist could point out that simplicity contributes to 
elegance, at least for the classical notion of elegance as simplicity with variety, 
famously stated by in the eighteenth century by William Hogarth(1753).Since 
axiarchism should lead us to expect an elegant universe, and elegance encompasses 
simplicity, axiarchism makes sense of the use of simplicity as an INO. 
Axiarchists could also argue that there are certain moral goods that can be more 
fully realized in a world structured for the development of scientific technology and 
discoverability. For instance, technology (which depends on discoverability) allows for 
the embodied conscious agents (ECAs) that arise in the universe to influence each other 
for good or for ill on a much larger scale, thereby greatly increasing the range and 
extent of potential virtuous responses and positive connections between these agents. In 
addition, one might think scientific discovery is important in and of itself. They could 
then go on to argue, as I will below, that the universe’s manifesting the right kind of 
simplicity often greatly aids in its discoverability. Thus, given that we can glimpse some 
good coming from a universe that gives rise to ECAs that can discover it, axiarchism 
renders it unsurprising that the universe will be discoverable, and hence unsurprising 
that simplicity will generally be a good guide in scientific theorizing. 
Although the axiarchic thesis constitutes an enormous assumption about the 
structure of reality beyond what we can observe or deduce by the accepted rules of 
logic, any PINO of the naturalist will also. Thus, even if axiarchists cannot offer a 
further justification for their thesis (such as via an argument for theism), that would not 
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make axiarchism worse off than naturalists, since as discussed above, to engage in 
scientific inquiry they also must posit their PINO without further justification. 
One could also put the point as follows. If value is defined more generally as any 
property that comes in degrees and plays a normative role, then to engage in scientific 
inquiry one must be committed to some property, p, being a PINO. Axiarchists hold that 
this property involves moral value; naturalists deny this, opting for some non-moral 
value – typically simplicity, or somewhat reluctantly, elegance, which is a “half-way 
house” between simplicity as a PINO and moral and aesthetic value as a PINO.2 
Given that neither taking simplicity nor moral and aesthetic value as one’s PINO 
can be justified in a non-circular why, does the practice of science itself give us a reason 
to prefer one over the other? I will now argue that the way simplicity is actually used in 
scientific theory choice implicitly assumes that the universe is teleologically structured 
for discoverability, an assumption that is compatible with taking moral and aesthetic 
value as a PINO but not the way naturalists need to treat simplicity as a PINO (namely, 
as not involving teleology).Specifically, the kind of simplicity that has been successful 
in science, and is now implicitly considered normative, is simplicity in the humanly 
practical limit, not absolute simplicity or elegance. This kind of simplicity is one that 
helps us in the process of discovering even deeper laws of nature, and so is implicitly 
teleological. 
As an example, consider Newton’s law of gravity, F = Gm1m2/r
2
, where F is the 
force between two masses (m1 and m2) separated by a distance r. This is a relatively 
simple equation. Newton’s theory has been enormously successful, yet by 1920 it was 
superseded by Einstein’s general theory of relativity, which conceptualizes gravity in 
terms of a curvature in four-dimensional space time. Like Newton’s equation, Einstein’s 
equation is simple – namely, G = 8πT, where G is the Einsteinian tensor that gives the 
curvature of space time and T is the stress-energy tensor that represents the density and 
                                                          
2Many leading physicists have acknowledged this “half-way house” of elegance as an important criterion of theory 
choice. This is well-known with regard to Albert Einstein.  Here are two other examples. Paul Dirac, a major figure in 
20th century physics and one of the founders of quantum mechanics, famously stated that “it is more important to 
have beauty in one’s equations than to have them fit experiment” (Dirac, 1963: 47).  Similarly, according to Steven 
Weinberg, a Nobel Laureate in Physics, “Not only is our aesthetic judgment a means to the end of finding scientific 
explanations and judging their validity – it is part of what we mean by an explanation” (Weinberg, 1994: 149). He 
further states that “mathematical structures that confessedly are developed by mathematicians because they seek a 
sort of beauty are often found later to be extraordinarily valuable by the physicist” (Weinberg, 1994: 153). 
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motion of matter in space. Newton’s equation and Einstein’s equation are only simple, 
however, when written in terms of their respective mathematical frameworks: for 
Newton, a three-dimensional flat Euclidian space and for Einstein a semi-Riemannian 
geometry, in which the time and space dimensions are intermixed. When Newton’s 
equation is written in terms of Einsteinian mathematical framework, it is very complex, 
and vice versa. So, the simplicity or complexity of the motion of mass-energy expressed 
by these equations depends on the mathematical framework in which they are written. 
This is analogous to the number π. It can be expressed in a simple way in terms of 
geometrical concepts, namely as the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its 
diameter; yet expressed in numerical form, it is infinitely complex, being an irrational 
number with an infinite number of digits that never start repeating. 
When expressed in terms of the Newtonian mathematical framework, Einstein’s 
law of gravity becomes Newton’s law with an enormous – perhaps even infinite -- 
number correction terms that take into account the configuration and motion of the 
matter: that is, as F = Gm1m2/r
2
 + many, many correction terms. Hence, the actual 
motion of matter due to gravity is enormously complex when expressed in the 
Newtonian mathematical framework. The reason Newton was able to up with his law of 
gravity was because for most practical purposes these correction terms could be 
ignored; just like for most practical purposes, one can use 3.159 as an adequate 
approximation for π. After hundreds of years of applying Newton’s law, scientists 
realized that it was not accurate in certain situations – such as when applied to the orbit 
of Mercury. 
The fact that these correction terms are small for most practical purposes is both 
the result of the form of Einstein’s equation and the fact that we have developed where 
the gravitational fields are small and the relative velocities of the matter around us is 
small compared to the speed of light. If the earth orbited around a black hole, these 
correction terms would be substantial, and hence Newton’s equation would have not 
provided a successful description of the gravitational interactions that we encountered in 
practice. In that case, the criterion of simplicity would not have allowed the discovery of 
his equation. So, the success of simplicity in discovering Newton’s law was not because 
the ultimate law of gravity is simple, but because expressed in the Newtonian 
framework, it takes on a simple form for almost all practical purposes. Further, it would 
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have been almost impossible to make the leap to the Einsteinian mathematical 
framework without the tremendous success of Newton’s law in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. 
Similar things could be said about the relation of quantum mechanics to classical 
mechanics: if the probabilistic predictions of quantum mechanics are written out in the 
classical mathematical framework with real numbers denoting quantities, one obtains 
simple equations (corresponding to the equations of classical mechanics), with infinitely 
many correction terms that are very small except when quantum effects become 
important. (If this were not the case, there would not have been any need to develop 
quantum mechanics.) This simplicity in the humanly practical limit – what could be 
called practical simplicity – has allowed us to discover the classical equations while at 
the same time providing the experimental basis for moving to the quantum framework. 
To make sense of the success and continued use of this practical simplicity, one 
cannot merely assume that the underlying law structure of the world is likely to be 
simple or elegant. Neither of these would give us any grounds for thinking that the 
equations of physics would be simple in the humanly accessible limits within ultimately 
unsatisfactory mathematical frameworks (such as the Newtonian frame-work), but not 
simple outside those practically useable limits. Being structured for discoverability, 
however, does make sense of it. Given our limited cognitive capacities, we would 
expect a discoverable world to be one structured so that practical simplicity is a useful 
guide. Thus we would expect a universe that is optimally discoverable to be such that 
(1), at each conceptual framework (such as the flat space-time of Newtonian 
mechanics), simplicity would offer a generally good guide; but (2), it would fail at the 
boundaries, thereby forcing the ECAs in that universe to go to the next theoretical rung 
(e.g., such as to the curved space-time of Einstein) in their scientific quest. 
The above illustrates that what could be called practical simplicity, not the 
absolute simplicity of a theory, that has been successful in scientific practice. In fact, 
since most physicists think that current physics is a low energy approximation to some 
higher-level set of theories, most likely formulated in a mathematical framework as 
different from the current one as the framework of general relativity is from Newtonian 
mechanics, it is this form of simplicity that they implicitly use. They do not think the 
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absolutely simplest equation in the current framework – the one without any small 
correction terms – is the most likely to be true. 
The naturalist could respond that it is also a lucky brute fact that the universe has 
exhibited this practical simplicity. This response, however, misses an important point: 
scientists continue to be confident in this form of simplicity. If the success of practical 
simplicity (or any other type of simplicity) is merely considered an accidental regularity 
– something that just happens by chance – there are no grounds for expecting it to 
continue. Yet, scientists do expect practical simplicity to continue to work – and this is 
true even in the practice of predictively relying on virtually any equation of physics, 
since as illustrated by the curve fitting example, there are always an indefinite number 
of competitors that account for the data but yield radically different predictions. 
Practical simplicity is what separates out the equations actually used from these 
competitors. (It is not absolute simplicity since most physicists think that current 
physics is a low energy approximation to some higher-level set of theories, most likely 
formulated in a mathematical frame-work as different from the current one as the 
framework of general relativity is from Newtonian mechanics.) Thus, one must not only 
assume that the world just happens  to have been structured for the success of practical 
simplicity, but that it is non-accidentally structured in this way, whatever further 
account one gives of  this idea of being non-accidental. Because practical simplicity 
makes essential reference to the limitations of ECAs, relying on it appears to involve an 
implicit teleological commitment to the universe being structured for discoverability, 
which is at best difficult to reconcile with naturalism.
3
 
Next, I will consider the potential implications of methodological 
axiarchism/theism for future science. 
IV POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE SCIENCE 
In applying methodological axiarchism/theism to any area of inquiry, one’s 
value intuitions will play a critical role. Specifically, methodological axiarchists assume 
that the universe is structured in such a way as to fully satisfy the range of our deepest 
                                                          
3Philosopher Mark Steiner (1998) has developed this idea in some depth for the case of physics. By looking at many 
examples, he argues that the practice of scientists assumes that the world is more user-friendly than would make 
sense under naturalism. He does not use my example of simplicity, however. 
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value intuitions, not just that of simplicity or beauty, but also our moral and spiritual 
intuitions. This means that among theories that explain the data and are logically 
consistent, they will prefer those that best meet these value intuitions.  
What might some of these value intuitions be that could guide one’s scientific 
theorizing? Besides beauty and discoverability, one might think that a morally 
satisfying universe would be one that had a certain moral and aesthetic richness. This 
might incline one against certain forms of reductionism. Reductionist views, I believe, 
are often espoused largely on the basis of their seeming simplicity, which, I believe, 
partly explains why many scientists and philosophers insist on the reduction of 
consciousness to physical processes despite the severe problems that one encounters. If 
one adopts moral and aesthetic value as one’s PINO, and one thinks that a non-
reductionist view would allow for a realization of deeper moral and aesthetic values, 
then this major motivation for reductionism will be lost; this could in turn have major 
effects on scientific theorizing in the field of consciousness studies, at least for those 
who are open to the axiarchist’s PINO. 
Further, many find growth, creativity, and interconnection of value. For instance, 
many people feel alienated from each other and the created order, and feel the absence 
of such connection as something bad. Part of the source of this sense of alienation is the 
mechanistic worldview that is left over from the scientific revolution, a view which 
many scientists unthinkingly adopt. This view typically takes the form of a particular 
kind of reductionism, what could be called mechanical reductionism, according to 
which the behavior of wholes can be explained entirely by their parts and their 
spatiotemporal relations. In this view, the universe and human beings consist of nothing 
more than elementary particles and fields interacting according to the laws of physics. 
Insofar as things are interconnected with each other, the interconnections are via 
external causal interactions and spatial-temporal relations. There is no deep 
interconnection that penetrates into the interior of the things that are interconnected. 
Although mechanical reductionism is implicitly assumed by many scientists, it is 
not consistent with modern physics, particularly quantum mechanics (QM).
4
As Timothy 
                                                          
4Indeed, this sort of reductionism is even inconsistent with the other fundamental pillar of modern physics, Einstein’s 
general theory relativity, at least according to one of its leading experts, Cambridge University mathematical 
physicist Roger Penrose (1989: 220-1). 
METHODOLOGICAL THEISM 
 
REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE FILOSOFIA DA RELIGIÃO / BRASÍLIA / V. 3 N.2 /P. 09-26 /DEZ. 2016 / ISSN 2352-8284 
23 
 
Maudlin, a leading philosopher of physics, states:  
…the physical state of a complex whole cannot always be reduced to those of its parts, 
or to those of its parts together with their spatiotemporal relations, even when the parts 
inhabit distinct regions of space. Modern science, and modern physics in particular, can 
hardly be accused of holding [mechanical] reductionism as a central premise, given that 
the result of the most intensive scientific investigations in history is a theory that 
contains an ineliminable holism (Maudlin, 1998: 55). 
 For axiarchists who hold that rich interconnections are of value, this 
inconsistency would be no surprise. To illustrate what I am talking about in a little more 
depth, we will consider a view along these lines proposed by biologist Rupert 
Sheldrake. A former research fellow in biology of the Royal Society, Sheldrake is 
regarded by many as one of the most innovative biologists living today, while at the 
same time by many other scientists as a ‘scientific heretic’ who has attempted to fuse 
‘magic’ with science based on inadequate evidence. 
 Sheldrake hypothesizes that living organisms are much more deeply 
interconnected than recognized within standard biology and biochemistry. Specifically, 
he postulates that there are deep pattern forming fields that provide non-local 
connections and coordination between organisms. One kind of coordination Sheldrake 
considers is the ability of cells to differentiate into enormously complex patterns – such 
as that of the human body – during embryonic development, a process called 
morphogenesis (Sheldrake, 1988).The standard orthodoxy in biology attempts to 
understand morphogenesis within a mechanical reductionist framework – namely, in 
terms of highly structured chemical gradients that tell cells how to differentiate, with the 
gradients ultimately generated by an organism’s DNA. Yet, as Nikoloz Tsikolia points 
out (Tsikolia, 2006: 335), although chemical gradients often play a necessary role in cell 
differentiation, the developmental pattern often remain the same despite substantial 
differences in the gradient, such as those caused by random fluctuations in a particular 
gradient or those produced by alternative developmental pathways. From the 
experimental data, Tsikolia concludes that unknown non-local principles must be at 
play in morphogenesis, though he does not explicitly subscribe to Sheldrake’s 
hypothesis (Tsikolia, 2006: 335). 
 To explain this and other cases of highly organized coordination, Sheldrake 
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proposes a theory of morphogenic (‘pattern forming’) fields that are not reducible to 
chemistry and can be non-local. He speculates that these fields undergo what he calls 
“morphic resonance” with those morphogenic fields of past and present organisms to 
which an organism is closely related, resulting in a form of mimetic information 
transfer. He claims his hypothesis could provide a fruitful framework for explaining not 
only morphogenesis, but a wide range of other phenomena involving large-scale 
coordination and connection. For example, he cites the ability of homing pigeons, sea 
turtles, and the like to find their way home after being displaced over more than a 
thousand miles from their point of origin. As can be seen by looking at several issues of 
the Journal of Experimental Biology devoted to this phenomenon, all hypotheses not 
involving non-local, global coordination that scientists have proposed in the last thirty 
years face enormous theoretical obstacles or are inconsistent with experiments
5
. 
Although there could always be overlooked hypotheses, this failure suggests that we 
should take seriously the possibility of some non-local connection. 
 As another example of how his hypothesis works, Sheldrake considers 
experiments that purportedly show that if rats learn to navigate a certain type of maze in 
the USA, rats at distant locations, such as Australia, will subsequently learn to navigate 
the maze much more quickly (Sheldrake, 1988: 174-177).  He speculates that the first 
rats that learned the maze modified their collective information fields. Then, via 
morphic resonance, subsequent rats picked up this new information. Sheldrake also cites 
how once a few birds in Europe learned to open milk bottles, this ability spread far more 
quickly through the bird population than seems possible by recognized, local means of 
information transfer (Sheldrake, 1988: 177-181). Sheldrake proposes that this morphic 
resonance is a pervasive phenomenon in nature, occurring all the way from protein 
folding to human society.  Since these morphic fields evolve, what could be thought of 
as ‘creativity’ is built into them. 
 Of course, Sheldrake’s hypotheses might prove to be false. But I think that one 
who adopts the axiarchist’s PINO will be much more sympathetic to them. If one is a 
naturalist, his hypotheses will be entirely unappealing since they postulate a rich but 
subtle underlying order that smacks of some sort of teleology. This appears to the 
                                                          
5See, for instance, Papi and Luschi (1996) and Walcott (1996). 
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reason for the swift rejection of his ideas without any examination of their empirical 
support: they are labeled as magic. For the naturalist, the most satisfying ultimate theory 
will be one that getting rid of as much appearance of teleology in the world as possible. 
For the theist, it will be one that shows in which the order of the world can be seen to 
realize value. In fact, Sheldrake himself is a theist, which probably has played a major 
role in him being willing to explore such unconventional hypotheses. 
I end with a quotation by William James, the famous American philosopher and 
psychologist: 
If we survey the field of history and ask what features all great periods of revival, of 
expansion of the human mind, display in common, we shall find, I think, simply this: 
that each and all of them have said to the human being, “The inmost nature of reality is 
congenial to powers which you possess (McDermont (ed.), 1977: 331).  
In the case of methodological axiarchism/theism, the claim is that reality is 
congenial to our moral and spiritual capacities – e.g., our longing for deeper connection. 
If James is right, adopting this view could lead to a great revival and expansion of the 
human mind. 
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